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Modern physics is founded on two mainstays: mathematical modelling and empirical ver-
ification. These two assumptions are prerequisite for the objectivity of scientific discourse.
Here we show, however, that they are contradictory, leading to the ‘experiment paradox’.
We reveal that any experiment performed on a physical system is — by necessity — invasive
and thus establishes inevitable limits to the accuracy of any mathematical model. We track
its manifestations in both classical and quantum physics and show how it is overcome ‘in
practice’ via the concept of environment. We argue that the scientific pragmatism ordains
two methodological principles of compressibility and stability.
The methodology of physics, pioneered by Archimedes, Galileo and Newton, has been crys-
tallising with the development of formal languages and statistical analysis. Its “unreasonable
effectiveness”1 is founded on two basic assumptions: Firstly, physical systems are modelled via
mathematical structures, which guarantee the universality and objectivity of the description. Sec-
ondly, the models are verifiable via a comparison of their predictions against empirical data.
The question whether there exists an ‘ultimate’ mathematical model of physical reality (or
an overarching “law of physics”), and whether it is intelligible, is controversial and has long been
the subject of philosophical debate2–6. This problem, however, seems irrelevant for the practice of
doing physics. Indeed, because of the finiteness of the available resources — any theory and any
set of empirical data must eventually be expressed as a finite combination of some intersubjective
symbols — no model can become arbitrarily accurate. Yet, we have to assume that our ignorance
is the only source of the uncertainty, for otherwise we would decree “[. . . ] that there exist aspects
of the natural world that are fundamentally inaccessible to science.”3
The second inexorable7 pillar of modern physics is the falsifiability of mathematical models
against empirical data. Again, in practice the hypotheses can only be confirmed at some confidence
level, yet we have to assume that this is solely caused by our incapabilities. In order for the
experiments to be conclusive and repeatable, we have to assure that they are free — that is the input
cannot be correlated with the studied physical system, until the experiment is actually performed.
The pertinence of this assumption has been recognised only recently on the occasion of the Bell
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tests8–10 demonstrating the predictive supremacy of quantum mechanics over “hidden variables”
explanations. Heuristically, it has been voiced by Stephen Hawking and George F.R. Ellis: “[. . . ]
the whole of our philosophy of science is based on the assumption that one is free to perform any
experiment.”11, p. 189
1 Local physics
The prodigious success of physics relies on the fact that one can probe physical systems locally,
that is abstracting from the ‘rest of the world’. The possibility of making a cut between a system
and its ‘compliment’ has been implicitly assumed in the scientific discourse from its dawn, but has
acquired a concrete shape only at the beginning of the 20th century. Voiced by Michael Faraday
and sharpened by Albert Einstein the principle of locality brought about the concept of spacetime
consisting of events12. The formalisation of the notion of an event gave it an operational sense and
thus established a rigorous link between the mathematical theory and ‘real world’ experiments.
The Einsteinian notion of spacetime (that is a 4-dimensional smooth Lorentzian manifold13)
could be and has been questioned from different standpoints14, 15. Nevertheless, any physical theory
must eventually make reference to the effective spacetime, in which the experimental data is being
gathered and shared. This comes about as follows:
Let us firstly note that intersubjective data is but a (finite) set of values of some registers. For
sake of simplicity we shall assume that the registers are bits, as any more complicated universal
description of the data sets can eventually be rewritten in the binary form. Now observe that any
data always comes in a sequence, that is as a totally ordered set of bits. Hence, it has an inbuilt
time-ordering informing that the bit b1 has been input, acquired or communicated before the bit b2.
Furthermore, given two data sequences one needs two different labels, say a and b, to distinguish
them. The notation {b1, b2, b3, . . .} purports that the bit b2 has been obtained at a place “b” in space
and a time “2”. Thus, any bit of the data uniquely specifies an event – a point in space and time.
The events are intersubjective – because the data is so. This is not at variance with the
fact that one can relabel the bits by ascribing them some explicit spacetime coordinates, such
as {(b1, t1, x1), (b2, t2, x2), . . .}. However, when doing so, one has to specify a ‘covariance law’
allowing one to unambiguously translate the local data from one coordinate chart to another. Any
such covariance law must hence eventually refer to an invariant object — call it a spacetime —,
which is common to all observers. The demand of covariance is not a falsifiable physical principle,
but a methodological assumption16 — a prerequisite for the intersubjectivity of physics.
To accommodate the local data any physical model must include a description of the effective
spacetime. But the actual purpose of a theory is to provide explanations, which go beyond the
directly observed phenomena. Therefore, the effective spacetime ought to contain also the potential
events. These are not directly associated with any empirical data, but they are necessary for a
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consistent explanation of the data. For example, the detection of a photon is an actual event,
whereas the photon emission from a star is a potential event indicated by the quantum theory.
Viewed from a different angle, the potential events are associated with empty registers, denoted
by ∅, for the data. This gives justice to the slogan: “Unperformed experiments have no results.”17
However, a conceivable explanation of the actual events in terms of the past potential ones
is not a sufficient criterion for a credible theory of physical reality. Indeed, the gist of physics
(and, actually, of the entire science) is the ability to predict future events. In particular, in order to
conceive technology of any sort we must be able to precisely forecast the future behaviour of the
designed devices. To enable predictions a theory must firstly make a distinction between the past
potential events and the future ones. More precisely, it has to specify a causal structure telling us
which of the past potential events could have influenced the actual ones and which of the future
events might be affected by the present ones. For instance, in Newton’s theory the future abuts the
past, so one cannot exclude in principle an immediate influence of a phenomenon in some remote
part of the universe on our empirical data. On the other hand, in Einstein’s theory the regions of
potential influence are constrained by the light cone structure.
2 The inconsonance of local experiments
A prediction of a theoretical model M is a claim about some future potential events. A sharp
prediction takes the form of a conditional claim: “If dpin was input andM is valid, then dpout ought
to be registered.” In such a case a single experiment with din = d
p
in, but dout 6= dpout would be
sufficient to falsify the modelM. In general, one formulates — more modest — statistical predic-
tions. These are expressed as conditional probabilities P (dpout |M, dpin) and they require multiple
independent experiments with din = d
p
in to validate M at a prescribed confidence level, which
we decree as satisfactory. Any two competing modelsM andM′ of a given phenomenon ought
to be discernible, M 6≡ M′, that is there must exist at least one experimental setting for which
P (dpout |M, dpin) 6= P (dpout |M′, dpin). Let us stress that at the level of falsification it is irrelevant
whether the modelM is fundamentally probabilistic — as quantum models are —, or effectively
statistical — as a result of ignorance of some of the system’s aspects, for instance its microscopic
structure.
For an experiment to be trustworthy, one has to warrant that the input data is free, that is
independent of the history of the physical system at hand. Concretely, we have to ensure the sta-
tistical independence of din and past states Ωpast pertaining to the system. The set Ωpast = Ωpast(M)
involves both the actual events associated with the existing data, as well as the past potential events
entailed by the modelM. In other words, a modelM must not imply correlations between Ωpast
and the potential future events related with din. For if it would do so, it would induce a statistical
bias in what could be tested and how, hence a priori excluding a part of physical reality from our
empirical cognition. If multiple experiments with different din’s are performed, so that P (din) can
be defined a posteriori, we can express the demand of freedom as P (din |Ωpast) = P (din).
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Any experiment has to involve at least one free bit of input data, as the experiment might
or might not be actually performed. Note that “experiment not done” is indeed an objective infor-
mation, which corresponds to a definite event din = 0. In this case, the event associated with dout
remains potential, dout = ∅, as “Unperformed experiments have no results.”17 On the other hand,
if the experiment was done, dout must take a definite value. For even if the experimental apparatus
did not register any signal, this mere fact corresponds to an objective information (cf. 18).
Let us fix a modelM of a chosen physical system F . Let us also suppose that F is embedded
in an environment E, which is not modelled withinM, but does affect the experimental outcomes.
This simply signifies that M = M(F ;E) includes some noise and/or free parameters. On the
physical side, it means that F did and does interact with E, which is natural, i.e. in principle
modellable.
Suppose now that an experiment with some din and dout has been performed, to check the
validity ofM. Since din is an (intersubjective, that is ‘classical’) information it must be physical,
hence it had to be supported (or ‘written’) in a form of ‘matter’ G. Whatever model of G we would
consider, it must be allowed to interact with the studied physical system F , because it actually did
so in the experiment just performed.
Let us suppose that the modelM did encompass the interaction of F and G. If G is a part of
F , that isM(F,G;E) ≡M(F ;E), then, clearly, din could not have been free. Suppose then that
G was included in the environment part: M(F ;E,G) ≡ M(F ;E). But then we admit that the
entire ‘experiment’ was actually a natural, that is modellable, phenomenon. Consequently, even
if no correlations between din and Ωpast were assumed withinM, there exists an extended model
M = M(F,E) providing a natural explanation of the entire ‘experiment’ hence, a statistical
dependence between din and Ωpast = Ωpast(M).
Therefore, in order to guarantee the freedom of din, we have to assume its independence in
any conceivable model
P (din |Ωpast(M)) = P (din), for allM.
In other words, the experimental input din has to be random (cf. 19). But then, once the experiment
was performed, we must update the model to take into account the interaction of F withG, symbol-
ically: M′(F,G;E) 6≡ M(F ;E). Note that such a change has global consequences — it affects,
in general, not only the future potential events, but also the past ones, because Ωpast = Ωpast(M).
This is what we might call the experiment paradox: We must assume that the experimental
input is free in order to perform credible tests of theoretical models, but then we allow for ‘non-
physical’ interventions, which are — by assumption — not modellable.
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3 Faces of the experiment paradox
We now unravel the manifestations of the experiment paradox in well-established physical theories.
A convenient universal framework for both classical and quantum mechanics uses the lan-
guage of states – encoding the properties of a given physical system F and observables – measur-
able physical quantities20. Any observable A has a spectrum sp(A) ⊂ R, that is a set of possible
measurement outcomes and any state ρ defines a probability distribution µρ,A over the set sp(A).
Models of local physical phenomena are formulated in terms of dynamical equations
f(ρ(t), t) = 0, for t ∈ [0, T ], (1)
where t is a time parameter and f is functional (typically, a linear differential operator) acting on
the space of states. Such a model specifies the time-evolution of the system’s state ρ(t) from an
initial condition
g(ρ(t), t)|t=0 = 0, (2)
determined by a (collection of) functionals g. It involves, in particular, the initial state ρ(0).
The predictions of the model (1) are then formulated as follows: If the system was initially
described by (2) and an observable A was measured at a time t > 0, then an outcome a ∈ sp(A)
will be obtained with probability µρ(t),A(a)1. Hence, to test a model determined by equation (1)
one has to prepare the system in an initial condition (2) and then measure an observable A at some
time t ∈ (0, T ]. Multiple experiments with different inputs would tell us whether the predicted
probabilities match the observed ones.
Note that the experimental input listed above is indeed free within model (1), because the
latter specifies neither the initial conditions (The model does specify the admissible forms of the
initial conditions, but not the numerical values.) nor the observable A and the measurement time
t. However, we have to admit that the studied system had been in some state (for instance, the
vacuum state) before it was prepared by the experimentalist.
Quantum theory, as opposed to classical mechanics, provides a formal operation correspond-
ing to the reset of system’s state – the von Neumann projective measurement. But, the admission
of projective measurements leads to the notorious measurement paradox (see Box 1).
To circumvent the ‘resetting problem’ we could construct an extended model
f(ρ(t), t) = 0, for t ∈ [t0, T ], (3)
1If the observable A has a continuous spectrum, then the ‘outcome’ is specified within some interval [a− δ, a+ δ]
and the probability is given by µρ(t),A([a− δ, a+ δ]).
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describing the evolution of the system from some earlier time t0 < 0 until T . Then, we assume
that its dynamics has been perturbed
f(ρ(t), t) = j(t), for t ∈ [t0, 0), (4)
with a suitable source j, so that the desired condition (2) at t = 0 is met, regardless of the primor-
dial system’s initial conditions at t = t0.
But, clearly, models (3) and (4) are different and the introduction of a source term is invasive.
Had the experiment not been performed, the object would evolve according to equation (3) rather
than (4). If, on the other hand, we attempt to model the source itself we lose (or rather, shift to
another level of complexity) its tunability — hence the ‘preparation paradox’ (see Box 1).
The same line of reasoning could be followed in the Heisenberg picture, in which the sys-
tem’s state remains steady, but the observables evolve in time. Let us also note that the source term
j need not be a function — it could be, for instance, a time-dependent Hamiltonian appended to
the Schro¨dinger equation of a given system.
In conclusion, regardless of whether the theory entails that the measurement — i.e. informa-
tion acquisition — disturbs the system or not, the preparation procedure is always invasive.
Fortunately, the experimental outcomes typically depend very weakly on how the system has
been prepared. The ‘triggering effects’, that is the details of the source j, can usually be alleviated
below the noise level shaped by the uncontrolled interaction of the system with its environment.
The experiment paradox is, however, more salient in the cosmological context, which does
not leave room for any environment. Modern cosmological models are formulated in the frame-
work of field theory. Let us emphasise that the fields do not evolve per se — a solution to field
equations specifies the field content in the entire (effective) spacetime. Therefore, any disturbance
coming ‘from outside’ would effectuate a global change. In other words, a local terrestrial experi-
ment affects both future and past states of the Universe (see Figure 1). Note also that cosmological
observations are indeed genuine experiments for, firstly, they might but need not be effectuated
and, secondly, they involve a number of tunable free parameters, such as the telescope’s location
and direction or electromagnetic spectrum sensitivity range.
As an illustration, let us consider a cosmological model based on Einstein’s equations
Gµν =
8piG
c4
Tµν , (5)
with a matter energy–momentum tensor Tµν (possibly including the “dark energy”, i.e. the cos-
mological constant term Λgµν). The geometrical Bianchi identity ∇µGµν = 0 implies the local
covariant conservation of energy and momentum ∇µTµν = 013. But, if an ‘external’ source term
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jν is introduced into (5), the conservation law is violated, ∇µTµν = −jν , explicitly breaking gen-
eral covariance. In other words, if one introduces into the universe some information which was
not there, one creates ex nihilo a local source of energy–momentum.
In quantum field theory, whereas the energy and momentum need not be conserved locally,
the suitable expectation values ought to be conserved. Concretely, if Tˆµν is the energy–momentum
operator constructed from quantum matter fields, then
∇µ〈ψ|Tˆ µν |ψ〉 = 0 (6)
should hold21 for any state vector |ψ〉. The introduction of a, possibly quantum, source jˆ violates
the constraint (6) leading to the Einstein anomaly and, eventually, to the breakdown of general
covariance21 (see also 22).
In order to perceive the experiment paradox from the perspective of ‘cosmic evolution’ we
firstly need to choose a time function — that is an observer —, which fixes an effective splitting of
the global spacetime into space and time13. Secondly, one has to assure that equations (5) allow for
a well-defined Cauchy problem23. The latter consists in imposing initial data on a time-slice, say
at observer’s time t = 0, and studying its (maximal) hyperbolic development (see Figure 1). This
guarantees that both past and future field configurations are uniquely derived from the imposed
initial data. The objectivity of the evolution is guaranteed by general covariance, which enables
unequivocal transcription of the time-slice field configurations for different observers.
Now, a free perturbation, or an abrupt change of initial data on a time-slice in a region
K of space inflicts a change in both causal future J+(K) and causal past J−(K) of K. The
problem persists in the context of quantum field theory, because of the “time-slice axiom”12. This
is independent from the fact that projective measurements are as harmful to quantum field theory
as they are to the non-relativistic quantum theory.
4 Consequences for foundations of physics
If we define the ‘fundamental level of physics’ as being in principle subject to both arbitrarily
accurate modelling and experimental probing, then it does not exist — because of the unveiled
paradox. Furthermore, the assumption about the existence of ‘ontic’ random events is a method-
ological necessity (see Box 2). Yet, there is no decisive procedure to check post factum whether an
event was random or not.
The experiment paradox has profound consequences for the philosophy of science, which
shall be discussed elsewhere24. Nevertheless, from the practical point of view, one may adopt the
perspective that “all models are wrong, but some of them are useful.”25
7
Figure 1: The conformal diagram for the Minkowski spacetime. The field content of the entire
spacetime is uniquely determined by initial data imposed on a Cauchy hypersurface S. Conse-
quently, a free intervention effectuated in the region K induces a change both in the causal future
J+(K) and the causal past J−(K) of K. More generally, the outer diamond could serve as an
illustration for the maximal Cauchy development of the hypersurface S.
The ‘usefulness’ of theoretical models is quantified by their explanatory and predictive power.
These rely on two key properties: compressibility and stability. The former means that we can de-
scribe large sets of empirical data within a tight theoretical scheme based on several overarching
rules. Notwithstanding, the theory itself might need to be expressed in terms of sophisticated math-
ematical structures26. By “stability” we understand the independence of the laws of nature from
the testing procedures. It guarantees the repeatability of experiments and, eventually, enables the
construction of trustworthy devices.
As expressed in a compressed quote from Albert Einstein: “Everything should be made as
simple as possible, but no simpler.”27
Acknowledgements We are grateful to Michael Heller, Ryszard Horodecki and Tomasz Miller for inspir-
ing discussions and enlightening comments on the manuscript.
The work of ME was supported by the National Science Centre in Poland under the research grant Sonatina
(2017/24/C/ST2/00322). PH acknowledges support by the Foundation for Polish Science through IRAP
project co-financed by EU within Smart Growth Operational Programme (contract no. 2018/MAB/5).
8
BOX 1: Chains of causal reasoning
1) The measurement paradox
F
E
F
E
F ′
E ′
din
. . .. . .
Let F be a quantum system described by the quantum state ρ and suppose that we choose
to measure an observable A, according to our free input din. Then, the standard von Neumann
postulate of quantum mechanics implies that after the measurement the system’s state jumps
abruptly to ρ′ – one of the (pure) eigenstates of the observable A. Such a ‘non-physical’
intervention can be given a natural explanation by embedding F in a (quantum) environmentE
and invoking the formal equivalence of projective measurements on F with a unitary evolution
on F ⊗ E28. But then we face the notorious Wigner’s friend paradox29 and are eventually
forced to conclude30 that no definite dout can ever be consistently produced.
2) The preparation paradox
F ′
E ′
F
E
F
E
dout
. . .. . .
The preparation paradox is the ‘mirror’ version of the measurement paradox. Suppose
that we have obtained an output dout from an experiment performed on the system F . By
seeking a ‘purely natural’ explanation of dout we have to embed F in an environment E, the
interaction with which caused dout. But then no din has ever occurred and we have never
actually prepared the system in any way.
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3) Superdeterminism
F
E
F ′
E ′
F ′′
E ′′
. . .. . .
One could maintain that we never actually prepare physical systems or perturb them – we
just observe them evolving without effectuating any disturbance. But such a superdetermin-
istic viewpoint excludes a priori the possibility of any interaction with the ‘physical world’,
in particular it disallows any experiments. This firstly annihilates the explanatory power of
science and, secondly, it is highly unpractical for it excludes a priori the existence of devices
functioning according to our inputs.
4) Scientific Pragmatism
F
E˜
F
E
F ′
E ′
din dout
. . .. . .
In scientific practice we assume that our interactions with the studied system F encoded
in din do not have natural, i.e. modellable, causes and that the obtained information dout is
always definite and objective. In order to save the model’s consistency we have to warrant
that our interventions do not affect the past states of the system F . To this end we need to
embed it in a suitable environment E, which absorbs the ‘retrocausal’ effects (E → E˜) and
enables a consistent description of system’s history by multiple observers. Whether we wish
our interventions to affect the system’s future states (F 6= F ′, E = E ′) or not (F = F ′,
E 6= E ′) depends on whether we work in the observational paradigm (as, for instance, in
cosmology) or in the engineering one.
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BOX 2: Random events in nature
Any experiment requires at least one free, i.e. random bit (see Section 2). Quantum
theory implies that some of the events related to projective measurements are indeed random,
hence quantum phenomena could be used as ‘sources of randomness’. However, in order to test
the quantum theory itself we need to perform an experiment, the free input of which does not
rely on quantum theory. In general, we are always bound to assume the freedom of some events
in order to trust the experiments, as there exist no decisive procedure to check whether a finite
binary sequence comes from a ‘source of randomness’ or a complex deterministic algorithm31.
This insight uncovers a captivating similarity between theories and experiments. Any
formal theory is based on a collection of axioms, from which theorems are deduced. The
axioms cannot be ultimately proven true or false — this is a general fact stemming from the
limiting theorems in formal systems. In practice, we assume the axioms to be true and check
whether such a premise is useful for deriving new results. Similarly, any experiment is based
on a set of free bits (the ‘input’), which facilitate an explanation — within a theoretical scheme
— for the ‘output’. We do not ask whether these bits were ‘truly random’ or not, but rather if
the assumption about their freedom is useful or not.
Let us illustrate this observation with two concrete examples:
Consider an experiment consisting of multiple tosses of a coin. The assumption that
its binary outcomes are random is fairly useful32. Yet, a coin is admittedly a macroscopic
object following a definite trajectory determined by the gravitational attraction and air drag.
Hence, we could in principle establish a model of the coin toss, which would ‘explain’ the
outcomes. Clearly, such a model would be very complex and would rely on a number of
unknown parameters. Furthermore, it would likely be unstable – new ‘experiments’ (or, rather,
‘observations’) would require ad hoc adjustments. In consequence, although we could provide
a deterministic model of a coin toss, it would be fairly useless.
Let us now turn to the Bell test8, 33 – a foundational experiment aimed at demonstrating
the intrinsic randomness of quantum measurements. In a typical scenario two parties inde-
pendently perform measurements on a shared pair of entangled particles. Assuming that the
“locality” and “fair sampling” loopholes have been closed8, the Bell–CHSH theorem33, 34 says
that if the measurement outcomes are determined by a “hidden variable” λ and the settings
of the parties’ devices are free, that is uncorrelated with λ, then a certain measure of corre-
lations S between the outcomes is bounded, S ≤ 2. Yet, numerous experiments have shown
with a high statistical significance that the value of S exceeds 2, reaching the quantum bound35
S = 2
√
2. Consequently, one could conclude that there is no “hidden variable” explanation
and the outcomes are ‘truly random’, as implied by quantum mechanics. Alternatively, one
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could give up the “measurement independence” assumption and provide a fully deterministic
explanation9. However, the adequacy of such a ‘hidden variable’ model is highly questionable,
as, for instance, it would require the triggering of a common cause mechanism at the early
stages of the Universe’s evolution10.
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